纽约置业，先把复杂的事讲清楚。

大家好，我是Tony。

最近很多人都在问：美联储利率这么高，到底对房地产意味着什么？很多人的第一反应就是：房贷贵了，买房的人少了。这个当然没错。

但我觉得，真正值得关注的，其实不是这一层。高利率对房地产最大的影响，是它可能慢慢改变整个房地产的资金逻辑。

你可以把房地产想成一条链。第一环，是买房的人。

房贷利率高，月供就上去了，购买力自然下降。假设贷款100万美元，利率从6%到接近7%，每个月的本息月供就会增加六百多美元。

一个百分点，看起来好像没有多少，但对于真正背着几百万美元贷款的人来说，一年下来，就是几千、甚至上万美元的现金流压力。

所以第一个变化很简单：同样的钱，买不到以前那么大的房子。

但第二层影响，可能更加重要。买家觉得贵，卖家却不一定愿意降价。

为什么？因为很多老房主手里的贷款利率可能只有3%、4%左右。如果现在把房子卖掉，再买一套，等于把一个低利率贷款，换成一个明显更高的贷款。

所以你会看到一个很有意思的现象：买家觉得贵，卖家又不太愿意卖。

结果可能不是房价马上大跌，而是先出现：成交量下降，库存结构发生变化，买卖双方议价时间变长。

而第三层，其实才是我最关注的。房地产开发商。

买地，要贷款。盖房子，要贷款。商业地产，要贷款。公寓、办公楼、购物中心，背后很多项目都需要融资。

当融资成本长期维持在高位，一个原来能够赚钱的项目，可能重新算一遍账，就发现利润已经没有那么好了。

于是开发商可能会选择：不买地，不开发，推迟开工，甚至重新设计整个项目。

这也是为什么，我们不能只看今天房贷是多少。我们更应该观察：高利率会不会开始改变未来几年的住房供应。

因为今天少开发一个项目，影响可能不是今天出现。而可能是在两三年以后，当市场真正需要这些房子的时候，你才发现：当年的高融资成本，已经改变了今天的供应量。

所以高利率真正厉害的地方，不是一下子把房地产打下来。而是它可能一点一点改变房地产的周期。

而现在，我觉得还有一个更加值得观察的问题。美联储到底会不会很快重新降息？

9月16日，美联储把联邦基金利率目标区间提高到3.75%到4%。而9月的经济预测显示，官员对未来利率路径的判断仍然存在明显分歧。(Federal Reserve)

接下来还有10月和12月的会议。所以与其去猜：“12月一定加还是不加？”我觉得普通投资者更应该关注的是：每一次会议之后，市场对未来利率路径的预期有没有发生变化。

因为真正影响房地产的，往往不是某一天加了25个基点。而是市场开始相信：这个高利率环境，可能还会持续多久？

如果只是短期，很多开发商可以等等。很多买家也可以等等。很多投资人也可以等等。

但如果市场逐渐形成一种预期：高利率可能维持更长时间，那整个行业的计算方式都会发生变化。

开发商重新计算土地价格。投资人重新计算回报率。银行重新评估贷款风险。买家重新计算自己的购买力。甚至房东都会重新考虑：我的房产收益，到底能不能跑赢其他资产？

这时候，高利率影响的就已经不只是房地产了。它开始影响股票估值、企业融资、投资回报率，甚至普通人的消费能力。

因为资金是会流动的。如果低风险资产能够提供不错的收益，投资人就会开始问：为什么我要承担房地产的流动性风险、管理成本和空置风险？

所以我越来越觉得，我们真正需要观察的，不是：“房价明年到底涨还是跌？”而是三个东西。

1. 利率会在什么水平停留多久。
2. 高融资成本会不会继续压制房地产成交和开发。
3. 资本会不会开始重新在房地产、债券、股票和其他资产之间寻找新的平衡。

因为房地产最怕的，有时候不是利率高一点。而是大家开始适应一个新的利率环境。

一旦市场从“等降息”，慢慢变成“接受高利率可能持续更久”，买家、卖家、开发商和投资人的行为，都会慢慢改变。

而这，可能才是这一轮高利率对房地产最深层的影响。

最后还是会回到我们每个人的钱包：你的房贷，你的租金，你的投资组合，你的工作收入，甚至你未来买房的价格。

所以我觉得，真正值得研究的，从来不是某一次25个基点。而是：

如果高利率从一个短期现象，慢慢变成一种长期环境，我们每个人的资产负债表，会发生什么变化？

这个问题，可能比预测明年房价涨还是跌，更值得我们认真研究。

Hi everyone, I'm Tony.

A lot of people have been asking lately: With the Fed's rates so high, what does it actually mean for real estate? Most people's first reaction is: Mortgages are expensive, so fewer people buy homes. That's certainly true.

But I think what's really worth paying attention to isn't that layer. The biggest impact of high rates on real estate is that they may slowly change the entire funding logic of real estate.

Think of real estate as a chain. The first link is homebuyers.

With high mortgage rates, monthly payments go up, and purchasing power naturally declines. Take a $1 million loan as an example—as rates move from 6% toward 7%, the monthly principal-and-interest payment rises by more than $600.

One percentage point may not sound like much, but for someone truly carrying a multi-million-dollar loan, that adds up to thousands—even tens of thousands—of dollars in annual cash-flow pressure.

So the first change is simple: the same money buys less house than before.

But the second layer of impact may matter even more. Buyers feel it's expensive, but sellers aren't necessarily willing to cut prices.

Why? Because many longtime homeowners are holding mortgages at around 3% or 4%. If they sell now and buy again, they'd be trading a low-rate loan for a clearly higher one.

So you see an interesting phenomenon: buyers think it's expensive, yet sellers aren't eager to sell.

The result may not be an immediate plunge in home prices, but rather: transaction volume declines, inventory mix shifts, and negotiations between buyers and sellers take longer.

And the third layer is actually what I'm watching most closely: real estate developers.

Buying land requires loans. Building homes requires loans. Commercial real estate requires loans. Apartments, office buildings, shopping centers—many of these projects depend on financing.

When financing costs stay high for a long time, a project that used to pencil out may, after running the numbers again, turn out to be far less profitable.

So developers may choose to not buy land, not develop, delay groundbreaking, or even redesign entire projects.

That's why we can't just look at today's mortgage rate. We should be watching whether high rates will start changing housing supply in the coming years.

Because one fewer project developed today may not show its impact today. It may only become visible two or three years from now, when the market truly needs those homes, and you realize that the high financing costs back then have already changed today's supply.

So the truly powerful thing about high rates isn't that they knock real estate down all at once. It's that they may gradually change the real estate cycle, bit by bit.

And now, I think there's an even more important question to watch. Will the Fed cut rates again soon?

On September 16, the Fed raised its federal funds rate target range to 3.75%–4%. And September's economic projections showed officials remain clearly divided on the future rate path. (Federal Reserve)

There are still meetings in October and December. So rather than guessing, “Will they definitely hike or not in December?” I think ordinary investors should focus on whether the market's expectations for the future rate path have changed after each meeting.

Because what really moves real estate is often not a 25-basis-point move on a given day. It's the market starting to believe how long this high-rate environment might last.

If it's only short-term, many developers can wait. Many buyers can wait. Many investors can wait.

But if the market gradually forms an expectation that high rates may persist for longer, then the entire industry's math changes.

Developers recalculate land prices. Investors recalculate returns. Banks reassess lending risk. Buyers recalculate their purchasing power. Even landlords reconsider whether their property's returns can really beat other assets.

At that point, high rates are no longer just affecting real estate. They start affecting stock valuations, corporate financing, investment returns, and even ordinary people's spending power.

Because capital flows. If low-risk assets can offer decent returns, investors start asking: why should I take on real estate's liquidity risk, management costs, and vacancy risk?

So I'm increasingly convinced that what we really need to watch is not, “Will home prices rise or fall next year?” but three things.

1. How long rates will stay at what level.
2. Whether high financing costs will keep suppressing real estate transactions and development.
3. Whether capital will start seeking a new balance across real estate, bonds, stocks, and other assets.

Because what real estate fears most is sometimes not rates being a bit higher. It's everyone starting to adapt to a new rate environment.

Once the market shifts from “waiting for rate cuts” to slowly “accepting that high rates may last longer,” the behavior of buyers, sellers, developers, and investors will gradually change.

And that may be this round of high rates' deepest impact on real estate.

In the end, it all comes back to each of our wallets: your mortgage, your rent, your investment portfolio, your work income, even the price of your future home purchase.

So I think what's truly worth studying was never a single 25-basis-point move. It's this:

If high rates slowly shift from a short-term phenomenon to a long-term environment, what happens to each of our balance sheets?

That question may deserve more serious study than predicting whether home prices rise or fall next year.

大家好，我是Tony。

上一篇我们聊了一个问题：

高利率，到底是怎么影响房地产的？

但是接下来一个问题可能更加有意思：

现在30年固定房贷已经接近7%了。
(Freddie Mac)

按理说，

房贷这么贵，

买房的人应该越来越少，

那为什么房价没有跟着一起大跌？

这个问题，

其实特别值得研究。

因为房地产和股票最大的一个不同就是：

股票的价格，可以一天之内重新定价很多次。

但是房地产不是。

房地产是一套一套房子，

背后是一个个家庭，

还有贷款、税、保险、装修、生活需求。

所以高利率出现以后，

房地产往往不是马上"跌"，

而是先出现另外一种状态：

成交越来越难。

你可以想象一下。

一个买家看中了一套100万美元的房子。

以前6%的利率，

和现在接近7%的利率，

每个月的本息支出就已经明显不一样。

所以买家会开始想：

"能不能买便宜一点？"

"能不能少借一点？"

"要不要再等等？"

这就是高利率对需求端的影响。

可是问题来了。

卖家呢？

卖家为什么一定要降价？

特别是那些几年前已经买房的人。

如果他当年的贷款利率只有3%左右，

现在卖掉以后，

再买一套差不多的房子，

可能意味着：

把自己的低利率贷款，

换成一个接近7%的贷款。

这种情况下，

有些房主会想：

我为什么要卖？

所以就出现了一个非常有意思的现象：

买家在往后退，

卖家也不一定愿意往前走。

最后发生的事情，

可能不是房价马上大跌，

而是：

成交量先下来。

这一点其实已经能从现在的市场里面看到一些迹象。

比如8月份，美国现房销售速度放缓，Realtor.com的数据显示，待售房屋库存增加、销售速度下降，持续偏高的房贷利率继续给买家带来压力。(Realtor)

但是另外一边，

供应也没有一下子大量涌出来。

纽约尤其明显。

8月份纽约都会区活跃房源大约3.67万套，同比虽然增加了3.2%，但新挂牌量反而下降了1.7%。(Realtor)

所以你会发现：

需求受到利率压制，供应却没有完全释放。

这就是为什么，

房地产有时候会出现一种很奇怪的状态：

市场很冷，但是价格没有崩。

而且纽约还有一个很有意思的现象。

StreetEasy的数据显示，2026年8月，纽约市仍有21.8%的成交房源最终高于最近一次挂牌价成交。(StreetEasy)

这并不代表整个纽约市场都很火热，

恰恰相反，

它说明现在的市场越来越分化。

真正有竞争力的房子，

可能依然有人抢。

价格不合理、房子条件一般的，

可能就会在市场上待更久。

所以现在看房地产，

我觉得不能简单地说：

"利率高，所以房价一定跌。"

也不能说：

"房价没跌，所以市场没问题。"

这两个说法，

其实都太简单了。

真正应该看的，是三个东西：

第一，成交量。

买家到底还愿不愿意买？

第二，库存。

卖家到底愿不愿意把房子拿出来卖？

第三，价格。

当成交量下降以后，

卖家到底还能不能守住原来的价格？

这三个东西放在一起，

我们才能真正看懂房地产。

而且这里还有一个特别重要的概念：

房地产的价格有时候是"僵硬"的。

什么意思？

股票跌10%，

你今天就可以卖。

但是一套房子，

卖家可能宁愿不卖，

也不愿意一下子降10%。

因为他还有贷款，

还有税，

还有自己的心理价格，

甚至还有下一套房子的购买计划。

所以高利率环境下，

房地产可能出现的不是：

"价格马上跌。"

而是：

"买卖双方都开始等待。"

买家等利率，

卖家等价格，

开发商等融资成本，

投资人等回报率。

所有人都在等。

而这个"等"，

其实就是房地产周期变慢的一个重要表现。

所以我现在反而觉得，

我们研究房地产，

不要每天只盯着：

"房价涨了多少？"

"跌了多少？"

有时候更加值得看的，

是：

成交有没有变少？

房子是不是卖得越来越慢？

卖家是不是开始降价？

开发商是不是开始减少新项目？

因为这些变化，

往往会比房价本身更早告诉你：

房地产的周期，

到底发生了什么。

所以回到我们最开始的问题：

为什么利率这么高，房价却没有马上暴跌？

答案可能很简单：

因为高利率在压制买家，

但低利率旧贷款、有限的住房供应，以及卖家的惜售，

又在限制价格下跌的速度。

而真正值得观察的，

不是房价明天会不会跌10%。

而是：

如果高利率持续更久，

这种"买家不愿买、卖家不愿卖"的状态，

还能维持多久？

这可能才是下一阶段房地产真正值得关注的地方。

我是Tony。

我们下一篇继续往下拆：

为什么高利率最先杀掉的，

可能不是房价，

而是房地产的成交量。

Hi everyone, I'm Tony.

Last time we talked about one question: how exactly do high interest rates change real estate?

But the next question might be even more interesting:

The thirty-year fixed mortgage rate is now approaching seven percent. (Freddie Mac)

Logically, with mortgages this expensive, fewer and fewer people should be buying homes. So why haven't home prices crashed along with it?

This question is really worth digging into.

Because the biggest difference between real estate and stocks is this: a stock's price can be repriced many times in a single day.

Real estate is different.

Real estate is house by house, family by family, with mortgages, taxes, insurance, renovations, and real life needs behind each one.

So when high rates arrive, real estate usually doesn't drop right away. Instead, a different state appears first: transactions get harder and harder.

Imagine this. A buyer has their eye on a one million dollar home. At the old six percent rate versus today's near seven percent rate, the monthly principal and interest payment is already noticeably different.

So the buyer starts thinking: Can I buy something cheaper? Can I borrow less? Should I wait a little longer?

That is the impact of high rates on the demand side.

But here is the question. What about sellers? Why would sellers have to cut prices?

Especially those who bought years ago. If their mortgage rate was around three percent, selling now and buying a comparable home could mean trading their low rate mortgage for one near seven percent.

In that situation, some homeowners think: why would I sell?

So a fascinating phenomenon appears. Buyers are stepping back, and sellers aren't necessarily stepping forward either.

What happens in the end may not be a sudden price crash, but this: transaction volume comes down first.

We are already seeing signs of this in today's market. For example, in August, the pace of existing home sales slowed. Realtor dot com data shows for-sale inventory rising and homes selling more slowly, as persistently high mortgage rates continue to pressure buyers. (Realtor)

But on the other side, supply hasn't flooded the market all at once either.

New York is a clear example. In August, active listings in the New York metro area were about thirty-six thousand seven hundred, up three point two percent year over year, yet new listings actually fell one point seven percent. (Realtor)

So you see: demand is suppressed by rates, but supply hasn't fully opened up either.

That is why real estate can sometimes enter a strange state: the market feels cold, but prices haven't collapsed.

And New York has another interesting phenomenon. StreetEasy data shows that in August twenty twenty-six, twenty-one point eight percent of closed sales in New York City still sold above their most recent asking price. (StreetEasy)

That doesn't mean the whole New York market is hot. Quite the opposite. It shows the market is increasingly split.

Truly competitive homes may still attract bidding wars. Overpriced or average condition homes may sit on the market much longer.

So when looking at real estate today, I don't think we can simply say: rates are high, so prices must fall. Nor can we say: prices haven't fallen, so the market is fine. Both statements are too simplistic.

What we should really watch are three things.

First, transaction volume. Are buyers still willing to buy?

Second, inventory. Are sellers willing to put their homes on the market?

Third, price. After volume declines, can sellers still hold their original prices?

Only by putting these three together can we truly read real estate.

And there is one more especially important concept: real estate prices can be sticky.

What does that mean? If a stock drops ten percent, you can sell it today. But for a house, a seller might rather not sell than cut ten percent all at once. Because there is still the mortgage, the taxes, their psychological price, even plans for their next home.

So in a high rate environment, what real estate may experience is not prices drop immediately, but this: both buyers and sellers start waiting.

Buyers wait for rates. Sellers wait for prices. Developers wait for financing costs. Investors wait for returns.

Everyone is waiting.

And this waiting is an important sign that the real estate cycle is slowing down.

So I actually think that when we study real estate, we shouldn't just stare every day at how much did prices rise, or how much did they fall.

Sometimes what is more worth watching is: Are transactions shrinking? Are homes selling more and more slowly? Are sellers starting to cut prices? Are developers pulling back on new projects?

Because these changes will often tell you what is happening with the real estate cycle long before prices themselves do.

So back to our original question: with rates this high, why haven't home prices crashed?

The answer may be simple. High rates are squeezing buyers, but old low rate mortgages, limited housing supply, and sellers' reluctance to sell are limiting how fast prices can fall.

And what truly deserves attention is not whether prices will drop ten percent tomorrow, but this:

If high rates persist, how long can this state of buyers won't buy, sellers won't sell last?

That may be what really deserves our attention in the next phase of real estate.

I'm Tony. Next time, we will break down further: why high rates may kill real estate's transaction volume before they kill its prices.

大家好，我是Tony。

前面两篇，

我们一直在聊一个问题：

为什么利率这么高，房价却没有马上大跌？

今天我们往下再走一步。

我反而觉得，

高利率最先打击的，

可能根本不是房价。

而是——

成交量。

什么意思？

我们先看一个最新的数据。

截至9月17日，

美国30年固定房贷平均利率已经到了6.95%。

而8月份，美国成屋销售年化只有398万套，

比7月份下降2%，

同比也下降了1.2%。

与此同时，

全国待售库存反而增加到了162万套，

库存月数达到4.9个月，

是十多年来比较高的水平。 (Freddie Mac)

所以现在出现了一个挺有意思的现象：

房子越来越难卖，

但价格却没有同步大幅下跌。

为什么？

因为房地产不是股票。

股票跌了，

你可能今天就卖。

但是房子不一样。

一个卖家如果觉得：

“这个价格太低了，

我宁愿不卖。”

他完全可以把房子继续放在那里。

所以高利率来了以后，

市场可能首先发生的不是：

价格暴跌。

而是：

交易的人越来越少。

买家觉得贵，

不买了。

卖家觉得价格低，

不卖了。

最后买卖双方一起等。

这就是房地产市场非常典型的：

“量先缩，价后变。”

当然，

这并不意味着房价永远不会调整。

因为如果成交量长期低迷，

库存又不断增加，

卖家的资金压力开始变大，

那么最终还是可能通过：

降价、

让利、

延长上市时间，

甚至重新装修以后再卖，

来寻找买家。

所以真正值得观察的是：

成交量下降以后，库存有没有继续增加？

如果只是成交少，

但库存也没有明显增加，

说明很多卖家可能只是选择不卖。

可是如果出现：

成交量下降，

库存持续增加，

房子在市场上待的时间越来越长，

降价房源越来越多，

那就不一样了。

这时候，

市场的议价权就可能慢慢发生变化。

从卖家市场，

向买家市场移动。

而现在美国市场已经出现了一些这样的迹象。

8月份，

全国库存同比增加5.9%，

销售速度却下降。

这意味着买家相比前几年，

确实获得了更多选择和议价空间。 (Realtor)

但是纽约又很有意思。

纽约市8月份进入合同的房源同比下降5.4%，

可是仍然有21.8%的成交房源，

最终卖到了最近一次挂牌价以上。

Queens也有24.2%的成交房源高于最近一次挂牌价。 (StreetEasy)

这说明什么？

现在的房地产市场，越来越不能用一句“涨”或者“跌”来概括。

好房子，

合理定价，

位置好，

条件好，

依然可能有人抢。

但是那些：

价格定得高、

房子条件一般、

需要大量维修，

或者买家觉得不值得的房子，

可能就会在市场上待更久。

所以以后看房地产，

我觉得大家不要只问：

“房价跌了吗？”

我更建议看四个数字。

第一：

成交量。

到底有多少房子真的卖掉了？

第二：

库存。

市场上到底有多少房子在竞争买家？

第三：

Days on Market。

房子平均要卖多久？

第四：

Price Cut。

卖家是不是开始越来越频繁地降价？

因为这四个东西放在一起，

其实比单独看一个房价指数，

更能告诉你：

房地产市场的真实温度。

而这也是为什么，

我一直不太喜欢一句话：

“利率高，房价就一定跌。”

没这么简单。

更准确的说法应该是：

高利率首先降低了买家的购买力和交易意愿。

然后，

如果这种状态持续足够长，

才可能通过库存、现金流和卖家行为，

慢慢传导到价格。

所以，

真正值得我们观察的，

不是某一天房价跌了1%，

而是：

成交量下降以后，

这个市场还能不能保持住原来的价格。

这就回到了我们前面讲的一个核心问题：

高利率到底会持续多久？

如果只是几个月，

很多人可以等。

如果持续一年，

市场会慢慢调整。

但如果它变成一个更长期的资金环境，

那就完全是另外一回事了。

因为到那个时候，

房地产面对的就不只是：

“今天的房贷贵不贵？”

而是：

买家、卖家、开发商和投资人，

是不是都开始适应一个新的利率世界？

这才是我接下来最想研究的。

下一篇我们继续往下拆：

为什么很多美国房主明明想卖，却又不愿意卖？

这里面，

有一个非常关键的东西：

3%的老房贷。

Hi everyone, I'm Tony.

In the last two articles,

we've been circling one question:

Why haven't home prices crashed,

even with rates this high?

Today, let's take it one step further.

I actually think the first thing high rates hit

may not be home prices at all.

It's —

transaction volume.

What do I mean?

Let's look at the latest data.

As of September 17,

the average 30-year fixed mortgage rate in the U.S. reached 6.95%.

And in August, annualized existing-home sales were just 3.98 million units,

down 2% from July,

and down 1.2% year over year.

At the same time,

national for-sale inventory rose to 1.62 million units,

with months of supply reaching 4.9 months,

a relatively high level for the past decade-plus. (Freddie Mac)

So we're seeing something interesting:

Homes are getting harder to sell,

but prices haven't fallen in step.

Why?

Because real estate isn't the stock market.

When a stock drops,

you might sell it the same day.

But a home is different.

If a seller feels:

"The price is too low,

I'd rather not sell."

He can simply keep the house right where it is.

So after high rates arrived,

what the market may experience first is not:

a price crash.

It's:

fewer and fewer transactions.

Buyers think it's too expensive,

so they stop buying.

Sellers think the price is too low,

so they stop selling.

In the end, both sides just wait.

This is the classic pattern in real estate:

"Volume shrinks first, prices adjust later."

Of course,

that doesn't mean home prices will never adjust.

Because if low transaction volume persists,

inventory keeps building,

and sellers' financial pressure starts to grow,

then eventually they may still have to find buyers by:

cutting prices,

offering concessions,

staying on the market longer,

or even renovating before relisting.

So what really deserves watching is:

after volume drops, does inventory keep rising?

If transactions are slow

but inventory isn't building meaningfully,

it means many sellers are simply choosing not to sell.

But if we see:

falling volume,

steadily rising inventory,

homes sitting on the market longer and longer,

and more and more price cuts,

then it's a different story.

At that point,

pricing power may slowly start shifting.

From a seller's market,

toward a buyer's market.

And the U.S. market is already showing some of these signs.

In August,

national inventory rose 5.9% year over year,

while the pace of sales slowed.

That means buyers genuinely have more choices and more negotiating room than in recent years. (Realtor)

But New York is interesting.

In August, signed contracts in New York City fell 5.4% year over year,

yet 21.8% of closed listings

still sold above their most recent asking price.

In Queens, 24.2% of closings sold above the most recent asking price. (StreetEasy)

What does that tell us?

Today's housing market can no longer be summed up with a single word like "up" or "down."

A good home,

priced right,

in a good location,

in good condition,

can still draw competition.

But homes that are:

priced too high,

in average condition,

needing major repairs,

or simply not worth it in buyers' eyes,

may sit on the market much longer.

So when looking at real estate from here,

I think we should stop asking only:

"Have prices dropped?"

I'd suggest watching four numbers instead.

First:

Sales volume.

How many homes are actually selling?

Second:

Inventory.

How many homes are out there competing for buyers?

Third:

Days on market.

How long does it take, on average, to sell a home?

Fourth:

Price cuts.

Are sellers cutting prices more and more often?

Because these four together

tell you far more about

the real temperature of the housing market

than any single price index alone.

And that's also why

I've never liked the saying:

"High rates mean prices must fall."

It's not that simple.

A more accurate way to put it is:

High rates first reduce buyers' purchasing power and willingness to transact.

Then,

if that state lasts long enough,

it may slowly transmit to prices

through inventory, cash flow, and seller behavior.

So

what's really worth watching

isn't whether prices dipped 1% on some particular day,

but:

After volume falls,

can this market hold its prices?

Which brings us back to a core question from earlier:

How long will high rates last?

If it's just a few months,

many people can wait.

If it lasts a year,

the market will slowly adjust.

But if it becomes a longer-term funding environment,

that's an entirely different story.

Because by then,

real estate won't just be facing:

"Are mortgages expensive today?"

But:

Are buyers, sellers, developers, and investors

all starting to adapt to a new world of interest rates?

That's what I most want to dig into next.

Next time, we'll break it down further:

Why do so many American homeowners want to sell, yet refuse to sell?

There's something critical behind it:

the 3% old mortgage.

大家好，我是Tony。

前面三篇，

我们一直在聊：

为什么高利率没有让房价马上大跌？

为什么成交量反而先受到影响？

今天我们把镜头换一个方向。

我想聊聊卖家。

你可能会觉得很奇怪：

房价这么高，

不是应该有很多人赶紧卖房套现吗？

为什么很多房主反而不愿意卖？

这里面有一个非常关键的原因：

3%的老房贷。

什么意思？

假设一个家庭几年前买了一套房，

当时拿到的是3%左右的30年固定贷款。

现在如果他卖掉这套房，

未来还想在同一个城市买一套差不多的房子，

新贷款可能要面对接近7%的利率。

这就产生了一个非常大的落差。

你原来的贷款，

可能是3%。

新的贷款，

可能接近7%。

房子卖掉了，

低利率也一起消失了。

所以对于很多房主来说，

卖房不只是：

“我的房子值多少钱？”

还意味着：

“我以后要用多少钱的利率重新买回来？”

这就是所谓的：

Mortgage Rate Lock-in Effect——房贷利率锁定效应。

纽约联储的研究发现，

疫情期间大量美国房主锁定了非常低的长期房贷利率，

这在后来形成了明显的卖房抑制效应。

截至2024年底，

大约三分之一的美国房主，

房贷利率甚至低于3%。

而现在30年固定房贷已经接近7%。

所以你想象一下：

一个人现在有一笔3%的贷款。

让他卖掉房子，

重新贷款，

利率可能一下子多出几个百分点。

对于几十万、

甚至上百万美元的贷款来说，

这不是一个小数字。

它可能直接改变一个家庭的现金流。

所以很多人最后做出的选择就是：

不卖。

原来的房子继续住。

孩子继续在原来的学校。

工作也继续在那里。

甚至房子已经不完全符合自己的需求了，

也先忍着。

为什么？

因为换房的成本太高。

这就产生了一个房地产市场非常有意思的现象：

房主越不愿意卖，

市场上的房源就越少。

房源少，

买家选择就少。

买家选择少，

好房子的竞争反而可能依然存在。

所以你会发现：

高利率一方面压低了买家的购买力，

另一方面，

又通过低利率旧贷款，

限制了很多卖家的出售意愿。

两股力量，

刚好在市场里面对冲。

这也是为什么，

高利率环境下，

房地产有时候会出现：

成交量很低，

但是价格却非常“抗跌”。

当然，

这里千万不要理解成：

“有3%房贷，所以房价不会跌。”

没有这么简单。

因为房主不卖，

只是减少了供应。

如果就业恶化，

收入下降，

失业增加，

或者某些房主因为离婚、搬家、投资失败等原因必须卖房，

供应还是可能增加。

所以我们真正要观察的是：

这些“锁定在低利率里的房主”，什么时候开始愿意出来卖？

这可能比单纯观察房贷利率本身，

更加重要。

还有一个特别值得关注的地方。

这种锁定效应，

不仅影响房价。

它还影响：

房地产的流动性。

什么意思？

正常情况下，

一个家庭可能五年、七年、十年换一次房子。

房子卖掉，

买家接手，

新的贷款产生，

经纪人完成交易，

装修公司接到订单，

搬家公司有生意，

家具家电也会产生消费。

整个房地产市场其实是在不断流动的。

但是当大量房主都觉得：

“我现在3%的贷款太香了，

我为什么要换？”

整个链条就会慢下来。

所以高利率真正奇妙的地方就在这里：

它不只是影响买房的人。

它还改变了：

卖房的人，

开发商，

银行，

经纪人，

装修公司，

甚至整个房地产市场的交易频率。

而且这里还有一个我觉得特别有意思的问题：

如果这些低利率贷款一直存在，

未来几年房地产市场会不会越来越分化？

因为拥有3%贷款的人，

和现在第一次买房、必须承担接近7%贷款的人，

面对的是完全不同的资金成本。

一个人在同一个市场里，

可能住着一套低利率房贷的房子。

另一个人，

却要用接近7%的利率去买同样价格的房子。

这其实已经不仅仅是房价问题了。

而是：

资金成本不同的人，

进入的是两个不同的房地产市场。

所以我现在越来越觉得，

研究美国房地产，

不能只看：

房价是多少。

还要看：

谁手里的贷款利率是多少。

因为同样是一套100万美元的房子，

背后的贷款成本不同，

它对房主来说，

可能完全是两个世界。

所以回到今天的问题：

为什么很多美国房主想卖，

却又不愿意卖？

答案并不是他们不喜欢现在的价格。

而是：

卖掉以后，

他们可能失去一笔非常便宜的长期融资。

而这笔融资，

可能比房子本身的升值，

对这个家庭的现金流更加重要。

这也是为什么，

未来如果我们想判断房地产市场的供应会不会真正释放，

我觉得有一个数字非常值得继续观察：

房主到底什么时候开始愿意放弃手里的低利率贷款？

因为一旦越来越多的人愿意从3%的旧贷款，

走向接近7%的新贷款，

市场上的房源供应，

可能会出现完全不同的变化。

而这，

可能才是下一阶段房地产市场非常值得关注的一件事情。

我是Tony。

下一篇我们继续往下走：

为什么房子库存增加了，

房价却不一定马上跌？

因为房地产市场里面，

还有一个非常关键的东西：

库存的结构。

Hi everyone, I'm Tony.

In the last three articles, we've been talking about: why didn't high rates crash home prices right away? And why did transaction volume feel the impact first?

Today let's turn the camera in another direction. I want to talk about sellers.

You might find it strange: with prices this high, shouldn't lots of people be rushing to sell and cash out? Why are so many homeowners unwilling to sell?

There's a very key reason behind it: the 3% old mortgage.

What does that mean? Imagine a family bought a home a few years ago with a 30-year fixed loan at around 3%. If they sell now and later want to buy a comparable home in the same city, the new loan could face rates close to 7%.

That creates a huge gap. Your old loan might be 3%. The new loan could be close to 7%. Once the house is sold, the low rate disappears with it.

So for many homeowners, selling isn't just about "how much is my house worth?" It also means: "At what interest rate would I have to buy back in?"

This is the so-called Mortgage Rate Lock-in Effect.

Research from the New York Fed found that during the pandemic, huge numbers of American homeowners locked in very low long-term mortgage rates — which later created a clear dampening effect on selling. As of the end of 2024, about one-third of American homeowners had mortgage rates even below 3%. And now the 30-year fixed mortgage is close to 7%.

So imagine: someone holds a 3% loan today. Ask them to sell the house and borrow again, and the rate could jump by several percentage points. On a loan of hundreds of thousands — even over a million dollars — that's not a small number. It can directly change a family's cash flow.

So what many people end up choosing is: don't sell. Keep living in the old house. The kids stay in the same school. Work stays where it is. Even if the house no longer fully fits their needs, they put up with it for now.

Why? Because the cost of moving is too high.

And that creates a very interesting phenomenon in the real estate market: the less willing homeowners are to sell, the fewer listings hit the market.

Fewer listings means fewer choices for buyers. Fewer choices means competition for good homes may still be alive and well.

So you see: high rates squeeze buyers' purchasing power on one hand, and on the other hand, through old low-rate loans, they restrain many sellers' willingness to sell. Two forces, offsetting each other right inside the market.

That's why, in a high-rate environment, real estate can sometimes show this pattern: very low transaction volume, yet prices that are remarkably resistant to falling.

Of course, don't take this to mean "with a 3% mortgage, prices can't fall." It's not that simple. Because homeowners not selling only reduces supply. If employment worsens, incomes drop, unemployment rises, or some owners must sell because of divorce, relocation, or failed investments, supply can still increase.

So what we really need to watch is: when will these homeowners locked into low rates start being willing to come out and sell? That may matter more than simply watching the mortgage rate itself.

There's another place especially worth watching. This lock-in effect doesn't just affect prices. It also affects real estate liquidity.

What does that mean? Normally, a family might move every five, seven, or ten years. A house gets sold, a buyer takes over, a new loan is created, the agent closes the deal, the remodeling company gets an order, the moving company gets business, and furniture and appliances generate spending. The whole real estate market is actually in constant motion.

But when huge numbers of homeowners all feel "my 3% loan is too sweet, why would I move?" — the entire chain slows down.

So the truly fascinating thing about high rates is this: they don't just affect buyers. They also change sellers, developers, banks, agents, remodeling companies — even the entire market's transaction frequency.

And there's another question I find especially interesting: if these low-rate loans stick around, will the real estate market become more and more divided in the coming years? Because people holding 3% loans and first-time buyers who must take on close to 7% are facing completely different costs of capital. In the same market, one person may be living in a house with a low-rate mortgage, while another has to buy a similarly priced house at close to 7%. This is no longer just a home-price question. It's this: people with different costs of capital are entering two different real estate markets.

So I increasingly feel that studying U.S. real estate can't just be about "what are prices?" You also have to look at "what mortgage rate is in whose hands?" Because for the same one-million-dollar house, with different loan costs behind it, it can be two completely different worlds for the homeowner.

So back to today's question: why do so many American homeowners want to sell, yet refuse to? The answer isn't that they dislike current prices. It's this: after selling, they might lose a very cheap long-term financing deal. And that financing may matter more to the family's cash flow than the home's appreciation itself.

Which is why, if we want to judge whether housing supply will truly be released in the future, I think one number is very worth continuing to watch: when will homeowners actually become willing to give up their low-rate loans? Because once more and more people are willing to move from a 3% old loan to a close-to-7% new loan, the supply of listings on the market could look completely different.

And that may be something very worth watching in the next phase of the real estate market.

I'm Tony. Next time we keep going: why is it that even when inventory rises, home prices don't necessarily fall right away? Because there's another very key thing in the real estate market: the structure of inventory.

大家好，我是Tony。

前面三篇，

我们一直在拆一个问题：

高利率到底是怎么影响房地产的？

今天我们换一个角度。

如果买家因为利率太高，

不愿意买房，

那卖家呢？

按道理说，

买家少了，

卖家应该降价，

然后市场重新找到平衡。

可是现实没有这么简单。

因为现在有一个非常有意思的现象：

很多卖家不是不想卖，

而是不太愿意卖。

为什么？

答案可能就在他们手里的那笔贷款。

你想象一下。

一个家庭几年前买了一套房，

当时30年固定房贷可能只有3%左右。

现在呢？

30年固定房贷已经接近7%。

那么这个家庭如果今天把房子卖掉，

以后再买一套差不多的房子，

意味着什么？

意味着：

原来3%的贷款没了。

新的房贷，

可能要按照接近7%的利率重新计算。

这中间的差距，

不是一点点。

假设还有50万美元贷款。

3%的利率，

和接近7%的利率，

每个月的本息支出，

可能就差一千多美元。

一年下来，

就是一万多美元。

所以很多房主会开始算一笔账：

“我现在这套房子虽然已经不完全符合我的需求，

但是我的房贷利率这么低，

我为什么要换？”

于是就出现了一个非常有意思的结果。

房子想换，

但是贷款不想换。

这就是房地产市场里面经常说的：

Mortgage Lock-in Effect——房贷锁定效应。

它最大的影响，

其实不是让某一个家庭不换房。

而是：

大量家庭同时不换房。

如果一个市场里，

越来越多的人都不愿意卖，

那么市场上的房源自然就会减少。

而房源减少以后，

即使买家数量下降，

价格也不一定马上大跌。

所以你就会看到一个很奇怪的房地产市场：

买家说：

“太贵了，我买不起。”

卖家说：

“这个价格我也不想卖。”

最后怎么办？

大家一起等。

买家等利率下降。

卖家等价格上涨。

开发商等融资成本下降。

投资人等回报率改善。

整个市场的交易速度，

就这样慢慢降下来。

所以我一直觉得，

看房地产不能只看：

房价。

还要看：

有多少人愿意把房子拿出来卖。

因为房地产的价格，

其实是买卖双方共同决定的。

买家少，

当然会产生压力。

但是如果卖家也少，

供应同样会被压住。

这就是为什么：

高利率可以同时压制需求和供应。

这个逻辑非常重要。

因为很多人看到利率接近7%，

第一反应就是：

“房价应该跌。”

但房地产不是这么简单。

高利率确实让很多买家退出市场，

但与此同时，

它又让一些拥有低利率贷款的房主，

更加不愿意出售。

所以最后可能出现：

成交量下降得很明显，

但是价格下降得没有想象中那么快。

当然，

这里有一个非常重要的前提。

这不代表房价不会跌。

如果经济明显恶化，

失业增加，

收入下降，

或者大量房主因为特殊原因必须卖房，

那么这个锁定效应也不能永远保护市场。

所以真正值得观察的，

不是：

“3%的房贷是不是存在？”

而是：

有多少房主愿意为了换房，

放弃手里的低利率贷款？

这才是关键。

因为如果未来利率真的明显下降，

情况可能又会发生变化。

比如一个房主现在拿着3%的贷款，

他可能不愿意换。

但如果未来新的房贷利率明显下降，

从接近7%重新回到一个让他可以接受的水平，

那么这个人可能突然就愿意卖了。

于是：

低利率贷款释放出来，

房源增加，

交易恢复，

整个房地产市场的流动性也可能重新起来。

所以你会发现，

利率下降影响的可能不只是买家。

它还可能把一批原来不愿意卖的房主，

重新带回市场。

这就是为什么，

我们以后观察美联储的时候，

不能只问：

“什么时候降息？”

还应该问：

“降到什么程度，才足以让房主重新愿意换房？”

这两个问题，

其实完全不一样。

因为房地产真正需要的，

不是一个新闻标题上的“降息”。

而是：

利率下降到足够改变买家和卖家的行为。

所以回到今天的问题：

为什么很多美国房主想卖，

却又不愿意卖？

因为他们面对的，

不是简单的房价问题。

而是：

一边是自己的房子，

另一边是手里那笔非常便宜的长期贷款。

房子可以换。

但是3%的贷款，

换不回来。

所以很多人最后选择：

继续住。

而当越来越多人做出同样的选择，

整个房地产市场的供应，

就会发生变化。

这也是为什么，

高利率真正影响房地产的地方，

有时候不是把价格直接打下来。

而是：

先让整个市场变得不那么容易交易。

而下一篇，

我们就继续研究一个非常有意思的问题：

如果市场上的房子真的开始增加，

为什么库存增加，也不一定意味着房价马上下跌？

因为房地产市场里面，

还有一个经常被忽略的东西：

库存的质量和结构。

我是Tony，

我们下一篇继续聊。

Hi everyone, I'm Tony.

In the last three articles, we've been taking apart one question: how exactly do high rates affect real estate?

Today let's look at it from a different angle. If buyers won't buy because rates are too high, what about sellers?

Logically, with fewer buyers, sellers should cut prices, and the market should find a new balance. But reality isn't that simple. Because there's a very interesting phenomenon right now: many sellers don't lack the desire to sell — they're just not very willing to.

Why? The answer may be sitting in the loan they hold.

Imagine this. A family bought a home a few years ago, when the 30-year fixed mortgage might have been only around 3%. And now? The 30-year fixed is close to 7%.

So if this family sells the house today and later buys a comparable one, what does that mean? It means: the old 3% loan is gone. The new mortgage may have to be calculated at close to 7%.

The gap in between is not small. Say there's still a $500,000 loan. At 3% versus close to 7%, the monthly principal-and-interest payment could differ by more than a thousand dollars. Over a year, that's more than ten thousand dollars.

So many homeowners start doing the math: "This house doesn't fully fit my needs anymore, but my mortgage rate is this low — why would I move?"

And that produces a very interesting result. The house is ready to be swapped, but the loan is not.

This is what the real estate market often calls the Mortgage Lock-in Effect.

Its biggest impact isn't that one family decides not to move. It's that large numbers of families all decide not to move at the same time.

If more and more people in a market are unwilling to sell, listings on the market naturally shrink. And once listings shrink, even with fewer buyers, prices don't necessarily crash right away.

So you see a strange real estate market: buyers say "too expensive, I can't afford it." Sellers say "at this price, I don't want to sell either." And in the end? Everyone waits together.

Buyers wait for rates to fall. Sellers wait for prices to rise. Developers wait for financing costs to come down. Investors wait for better returns. The whole market's transaction speed slows down like this.

So I've always felt that looking at real estate isn't just about home prices. It's also about how many people are willing to put their homes up for sale. Because real estate prices are actually decided by buyers and sellers together. Fewer buyers certainly creates pressure. But if there are also fewer sellers, supply gets squeezed too.

That's why high rates can suppress demand and supply at the same time. This logic is very important. Because when many people see rates near 7%, their first reaction is "prices should fall." But real estate isn't that simple. High rates do push many buyers out of the market, but at the same time, they make some homeowners holding low-rate loans even less willing to sell.

So what may emerge in the end: transaction volume falls clearly, but prices fall less quickly than imagined.

Of course, there's a very important precondition here. This doesn't mean prices can't fall. If the economy clearly worsens, unemployment rises, incomes fall, or large numbers of owners must sell for special reasons, then this lock-in effect can't protect the market forever.

So what's truly worth watching is not "does the 3% mortgage exist?" but this: how many homeowners are willing to give up their low-rate loan in order to move? That's the key.

Because if rates really do fall meaningfully in the future, things could change again. Say a homeowner holding a 3% loan is unwilling to move now. But if future mortgage rates fall clearly, from near 7% back to a level they can accept, that person might suddenly be willing to sell.

Then: locked-in loans get released, listings increase, transactions recover, and the whole market's liquidity may come back to life.

So you see, a rate cut may affect more than just buyers. It could also bring a group of homeowners who were unwilling to sell back into the market.

That's why, when we watch the Fed going forward, we shouldn't only ask "when will they cut rates?" We should also ask: "How far must rates fall before homeowners are willing to move again?" Those two questions are completely different. Because what real estate really needs isn't a "rate cut" in a news headline. It's rates falling enough to actually change buyer and seller behavior.

So back to today's question: why do so many American homeowners want to sell, yet refuse to? Because what they face isn't a simple price question. It's this: on one side, their house; on the other, that very cheap long-term loan in their hands.

The house can be swapped. But the 3% loan can't be swapped back.

So many people end up choosing: keep living there. And when more and more people make the same choice, the entire market's supply changes.

That's also why the place where high rates truly affect real estate is sometimes not in pushing prices straight down, but in first making the whole market less easy to transact in.

And next time, we'll keep studying a very interesting question: if listings on the market really start to increase, why doesn't rising inventory necessarily mean prices fall right away? Because there's something often overlooked in the real estate market: the quality and structure of inventory.

I'm Tony. We'll keep talking next time.

大家好，我是Tony。

前面几篇，

我们一直在聊一个问题：

高利率到底是怎么影响房地产的？

今天我们再往下走一步。

很多人看到房地产新闻，

最容易产生一个判断：

库存增加了，房价是不是就要跌了？

听起来很合理。

但是房地产市场，

往往没有这么简单。

因为：

库存增加，不等于所有的房子都变得便宜。

我们先看一下现在的情况。

2026年8月，

美国房地产市场的活跃房源同比增加了3.6%。

全国库存月数已经到了4.9个月，

是2015年底以来比较高的水平。(Realtor)

听起来是不是应该：

房子多了，

价格就开始跌？

但实际情况是，

8月份美国成屋成交中位价仍然比去年同期高1.6%。(Realtor)

所以问题来了：

库存增加了，

为什么价格没有跟着大幅下降？

这里面有一个非常关键的概念：

库存不是一个简单的数字。

你不能只问：

“市场上有多少房子？”

你还要问：

这些房子是什么房子？

比如说，

一个市场里面有100套房子。

其中20套，

位置很好，

维护得很好，

价格也合理。

另外80套，

可能价格偏高，

需要装修，

位置一般，

甚至已经在市场上放了很久。

这时候，

你虽然看到：

“库存增加了。”

但真正能够吸引买家的，

可能还是那20套。

所以房地产市场里面经常会出现一种情况：

总库存增加，

但是优质库存并没有明显增加。

这两个事情，

完全不是一回事。

这也是为什么，

我们看房地产不能只看：

Inventory。

还要看：

Inventory的结构。

第二个非常重要的问题是：

库存为什么增加？

如果库存增加，

是因为大量新的卖家进入市场，

那对买家来说，

意味着选择真的增加了。

但如果库存增加，

主要是因为：

房子卖得越来越慢，

成交量下降，

旧房源不断积累，

那它反映出来的其实是：

需求变弱。

这时候，

库存增加的意义就完全不同。

所以：

库存增加本身不是答案。

我们需要知道：

它是因为供应增加，

还是因为销售速度下降。

而现在美国市场，

两个因素其实都有。

8月份，

全国成屋销售下降到398万套的年化速度，

比7月份下降2%，

同比下降1.2%。

与此同时，

未售库存增加到162万套。(Realtor)

也就是说：

卖得慢了，

市场上的房子却更多了。

这就是一个值得关注的信号。

但是，

我们还是不能直接跳到：

“房价马上要大跌。”

因为全国房地产市场差异非常大。

你看纽约，

情况就完全不一样。

2026年8月，

纽约市待售房源大约15,324套，

同比下降5%。

Queens的待售房源反而同比增加3.3%。

所以同一个纽约市里面，

不同区域的市场状态都已经不一样了。(StreetEasy)

而且更加有意思的是：

8月份纽约市仍然有21.8%的成交房源，

最终成交价高于最近一次挂牌价。

Queens也有一部分房子出现这种情况。(StreetEasy)

这告诉我们一个非常重要的事情：

市场冷，不代表所有房子都冷。

市场热，

也不代表所有房子都热。

真正决定一套房子卖得怎么样的，

还包括：

位置，

房屋状况，

价格，

户型，

地段需求，

以及同一时间市场上有多少类似房源。

所以以后你看到：

“库存增加10%。”

不要马上得出：

“房价要跌了。”

你应该继续问三个问题。

第一：

库存增加在哪里？

全国？

纽约？

Queens？

还是某一个具体社区？

第二：

增加的是什么库存？

好房子？

普通房子？

还是那些已经在市场上放了很久、不断降价的房子？

第三：

买家到底有没有跟上？

如果库存增加，

同时成交量也在下降，

那就要更加注意。

因为这意味着：

供应在增加，

需求却没有同步增加。

这种情况下，

卖家的议价压力才可能真正开始出现。

而如果库存增加，

成交量也增加，

那反而可能只是：

市场恢复正常交易。

所以同样是：

“库存增加。”

背后的含义，

完全可能不一样。

这也是为什么，

我越来越觉得，

研究房地产不能只看一个数字。

房价，

库存，

成交量，

新挂牌，

Days on Market，

Price Cut，

这些数字放在一起，

才是一张比较完整的地图。

而且这里还有一个特别值得我们继续观察的问题：

如果库存继续增加，

但房价只是慢慢调整，

那么最后真正先让步的，

到底是买家，

还是卖家？

这其实会决定下一阶段房地产市场的议价权。

如果买家越来越多，

卖家越来越少，

价格可能撑得住。

但如果买家越来越少，

库存越来越多，

而且越来越多房主开始降价，

市场的平衡就会慢慢发生变化。

所以我现在看房地产，

不会简单地说：

库存增加 = 房价要跌。

我更愿意看：

库存怎么增加，为什么增加，增加的是什么。

因为房地产真正有意思的地方，

从来不是一个数字。

而是：

数字背后的行为。

买家在做什么？

卖家在做什么？

开发商在做什么？

银行又在做什么？

这些行为叠加在一起，

才慢慢形成我们看到的房价。

所以第五篇，

我们先记住一句话：

库存增加，不一定意味着房价马上下跌。

但如果出现：

库存持续增加 + 成交量持续下降 + 在市时间变长 + 降价越来越多，

那这个组合，

就值得我们认真观察了。

下一篇，

我们继续往下拆一个更加有意思的问题：

为什么同样是美国房地产，

纽约、迈阿密、德州、加州，

面对同样的利率，

结果却完全不一样？

因为房地产最终，

还是一个非常非常本地化的市场。

我是Tony，

我们下一篇继续聊。

Hi everyone, I'm Tony.

In the last few articles, we've been talking about one question: how exactly do high rates affect real estate?

Today let's go one step further. When many people see real estate news, they easily form one judgment: inventory is up, so prices must be about to fall? It sounds reasonable. But the real estate market is often not that simple. Because: more inventory doesn't mean every house gets cheaper.

Let's look at the current situation first. In August 2026, active listings in the U.S. housing market rose 3.6% year over year. Months of supply nationally reached 4.9 months, a relatively high level since the end of 2015. (Realtor)

Sounds like it should be: more houses, so prices start falling? But in reality, the median price of existing-home sales in August was still 1.6% higher than the same period last year. (Realtor)

So the question is: inventory went up, why didn't prices fall sharply along with it?

There's a very key concept here: inventory is not a simple number. You can't just ask "how many houses are on the market?" You also have to ask: what kind of houses are these?

For example, say a market has 100 houses. Of them, 20 are in good locations, well maintained, reasonably priced. The other 80 may be overpriced, need renovation, in average locations, or have been sitting on the market for a long time.

At this point, although you see "inventory increased," what can actually attract buyers may still be just those 20.

So the real estate market often shows this situation: total inventory rises, but quality inventory doesn't rise noticeably.

Those two things are completely different.

That's also why, when we look at real estate, we can't just look at Inventory. We also have to look at the structure of inventory.

The second very important question is: why did inventory increase?

If inventory rises because a large number of new sellers enter the market, then for buyers, it means choices truly increased. But if inventory rises mainly because houses are selling slower and slower, transaction volume falls, and old listings keep accumulating, then what it actually reflects is: weakening demand.

At that point, the meaning of rising inventory is completely different.

So: rising inventory itself is not the answer. We need to know: is it because supply increased, or because sales pace slowed?

And in the current U.S. market, both factors are actually present. In August, national existing-home sales fell to an annualized pace of 3.98 million units, down 2% from July and down 1.2% year over year. At the same time, unsold inventory rose to 1.62 million units. (Realtor)

In other words: selling slowed down, yet there are more houses on the market. That's a signal worth watching.

But we still can't jump straight to "prices are about to crash." Because the national real estate market varies enormously. Look at New York — the situation is completely different.

In August 2026, New York City had about 15,324 homes for sale, down 5% year over year. Queens listings, on the other hand, rose 3.3% year over year. So within the same New York City, different areas already have different market conditions. (StreetEasy)

And even more interesting: in August, 21.8% of sold homes in New York City still closed above their most recent asking price. Queens had some homes in this situation too. (StreetEasy)

This tells us something very important: a cold market doesn't mean every house is cold. A hot market doesn't mean every house is hot either.

What truly decides how a house sells also includes: location, condition, price, layout, neighborhood demand, and how many similar listings are on the market at the same time.

So next time you see "inventory up 10%," don't immediately conclude "prices are going to fall." You should keep asking three questions.

First: where did inventory increase? Nationally? New York? Queens? Or one specific neighborhood?

Second: what kind of inventory increased? Good houses? Average houses? Or those that have been sitting on the market for a long time, cutting prices again and again?

Third: did buyers actually keep up? If inventory rises while transaction volume also falls, then pay closer attention. Because that means: supply is increasing, but demand isn't increasing along with it.

In that situation, sellers' pricing pressure may truly begin to appear. But if inventory rises and transaction volume rises too, that may instead just be: the market returning to normal trading.

So the same "inventory is up" can mean completely different things behind it.

That's also why I increasingly feel that studying real estate means never looking at just one number. Home prices, inventory, transaction volume, new listings, days on market, price cuts — these numbers together form a relatively complete map.

And there's one more question especially worth continuing to watch: if inventory keeps rising but prices only adjust slowly, then who actually concedes first — buyers or sellers? This will actually decide the next stage's bargaining power in the real estate market.

If buyers keep increasing and sellers keep decreasing, prices may hold. But if buyers keep decreasing, inventory keeps increasing, and more and more owners start cutting prices, the market's balance will slowly change.

So when I look at real estate now, I won't simply say: inventory up = prices about to fall. I'd rather look at: how inventory increased, why it increased, and what increased.

Because the truly interesting part of real estate was never one number. It's the behavior behind the numbers. What are buyers doing? What are sellers doing? What are developers doing? What are banks doing? These behaviors layered together slowly form the prices we see.

So for this fifth article, let's remember one line: rising inventory doesn't necessarily mean prices fall right away. But if you see: inventory keeps rising + transaction volume keeps falling + days on market lengthen + more price cuts, that combination is worth watching seriously.

Next time, we'll keep taking apart an even more interesting question: why is it that the same U.S. real estate, in New York, Miami, Texas, and California, facing the same rates, produces completely different results? Because real estate is ultimately a very, very local market.

I'm Tony. We'll keep talking next time.

大家好，我是Tony。

前面五篇，

我们一直在拆一个问题：

高利率到底是怎么影响房地产的？

但是到了这里，

我觉得我们必须把一个非常重要的问题讲清楚：

为什么同样是美国，

同样面对接近7%的房贷，

纽约的房地产，

和德州、佛州，

结果却完全不一样？

其实原因很简单：

房地产从来都不是一个全国统一的市场。

利率是全国性的。

但是房地产，

是非常本地化的。

你在纽约买一套房，

和你在德州买一套房，

背后的土地供应、人口、就业、税费、保险、建筑速度，

全部不一样。

所以同样的利率，

落到不同地方，

结果当然不一样。

我们先看纽约。

2026年8月，

纽约都会区活跃房源同比增加3.2%，

看起来库存是在增加。

但是新挂牌量反而同比下降1.7%。

而且纽约都会区的中位挂牌价大约74.9万美元，

同比下降1.4%。

看起来价格确实在调整，

但是调整并不算剧烈。

更有意思的是，

纽约的房子平均在市场上的时间大约56天，

比全国60天还要快。(Realtor)

这说明什么？

高利率确实在压制需求，

但是纽约的供应依然没有完全释放出来。

这其实和我们前面讲的：

“低利率旧房贷锁定效应”

是连在一起的。

很多房主手里有非常便宜的长期贷款，

不一定愿意为了换房，

重新承担高利率。

所以纽约市场即使受到高利率压力，

供应也不一定一下子大量增加。

但是你再看看美国其他一些市场，

故事就不一样了。

比如Austin。

2026年8月，

Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos都会区的中位挂牌价，

同比下降9.8%。

每平方英尺挂牌价格，

同比下降8.1%。

库存同比基本持平。

这和纽约的情况，

已经是非常明显的区别。(Realtor)

为什么？

这里面就涉及房地产最重要的一个东西：

供应。

一个地方如果过去几年盖了大量的新房，

当利率上升以后，

需求突然变弱，

市场上的选择就可能迅速增加。

买家就会说：

“你不降价，

我可以去看隔壁那一栋。”

卖家的议价能力自然就会发生变化。

而纽约这种土地和住房供应更加受限制的市场，

情况就可能不一样。

尤其是在一些需求长期存在、

供应又比较有限的区域，

高利率可以压低成交量，

但未必会马上把价格打下来。

这就是为什么，

我们不能简单地说：

“美联储加息，

美国房价就一起跌。”

没有这么简单。

再看佛州。

2026年8月，

Florida全州活跃房源大约28.6万套，

Realtor.com数据显示，

过去三年库存增加了43.96%。

全州中位挂牌价大约41.9万美元，

同比下降约3.5%。(Realtor)

Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach这个都会区，

库存同比下降15%，

但是中位挂牌价仍然同比下降2%。

这就再次告诉我们：

库存和价格之间，

不是简单的一加一关系。(Realtor)

因为房地产还有很多其他变量。

比如：

人口流入还是流出？

当地就业怎么样？

新房建设多不多？

土地供应怎么样？

房产税怎么样？

保险成本怎么样？

租金怎么样？

投资者占比怎么样？

这些东西都会改变房地产市场对利率的敏感程度。

所以我现在越来越觉得，

真正聪明的房地产分析，

不是问：

“美国房价怎么样？”

而是问：

“哪一个市场？”

甚至进一步问：

“哪一个城市？哪一个社区？哪一种房子？”

因为同一个城市里面，

不同房型都可能是两个市场。

新房和老房，

独栋和公寓，

投资房和自住房，

高端市场和刚需市场，

面对高利率的反应都可能不同。

这也是为什么，

作为一个纽约的房地产经纪人，

我自己特别喜欢观察：

宏观利率，

最后到底是怎么落到一个具体社区的。

比如同样是房贷接近7%，

一个Queens家庭，

可能最关心的是：

月供、

房产税、

学校、

通勤、

房屋维护成本。

而一个佛州买家，

可能还要更加关注：

保险、

飓风风险、

社区费用，

以及当地的新房供应。

同样一张美联储的利率表，

落到不同家庭身上，

其实已经是完全不同的账本。

所以这也是为什么，

我们前面一直在说：

高利率不是直接决定房价。

它更像一个压力测试。

它会把一个市场本身的问题，

慢慢放大出来。

供应本来就紧的地方，

可能表现成：

成交量下降，

但价格相对有韧性。

供应比较充足的地方，

可能表现成：

库存增加，

卖家开始降价，

买家议价能力提高。

而如果一个地方：

人口增长放缓，

新房供应又很多，

同时就业和收入也承受压力，

那高利率产生的影响，

可能就会更加明显。

所以未来我们看房地产，

我觉得可以记住一个非常简单的公式：

利率 × 供应 × 需求 × 当地经济。

这四个东西放在一起，

才是一个房地产市场真正的温度。

而不是单独看：

“美联储今天加息25个基点。”

因为美联储可以决定全国的资金价格，

但它不能决定：

纽约今天有多少房子挂牌。

也不能决定：

Austin今年盖多少新房。

更不能决定：

佛州的保险成本是多少。

这些东西，

最后才决定了：

同样的利率，

为什么不同地方会出现完全不同的房地产周期。

所以回到今天的问题：

为什么同样面对高利率，

纽约、德州、佛州却是不同的故事？

因为：

利率只是一个变量。

房地产真正的答案，

永远藏在：

供应、

需求、

人口、

就业、

融资、

税费，

以及当地人的真实居住需求里面。

所以以后大家看到新闻说：

“美国房价涨了。”

或者：

“美国房价跌了。”

我建议先别急着下结论。

先问一句：

哪里的房子？

因为美国房地产，

从来不是一个市场。

而是几千个不同的小市场，

拼在一起。

我是Tony。

下一篇，

我们继续往下走。

我们已经知道：

高利率会影响买家，

会影响卖家，

会影响成交量，

也会影响不同城市。

那么接下来一个问题就来了：

房地产开发商呢？

他们可能才是高利率环境下，

最早需要重新计算账本的人。

Hi everyone, I'm Tony.

In the last five articles, we've been taking apart one question: how exactly do high rates affect real estate?

But here, I feel we must make one very important issue clear: why is it that in the same America, facing the same nearly-7% mortgage, New York real estate and Texas and Florida produce completely different results?

The reason is actually simple: real estate was never one unified national market.

Rates are national. But real estate is very local.

Buying a home in New York versus buying one in Texas — the land supply, population, jobs, taxes, insurance, and construction pace behind them are all different.

So the same rate, landing in different places, naturally produces different results.

Let's look at New York first. In August 2026, active listings in the New York metro rose 3.2% year over year — inventory seems to be increasing. But new listings actually fell 1.7% year over year. And the median list price in the New York metro was about $749,000, down 1.4% year over year. Prices do seem to be adjusting, but the adjustment isn't dramatic.

More interestingly, homes in New York spend about 56 days on market on average, faster than the national 60 days. (Realtor)

What does this tell us? High rates are indeed suppressing demand, but New York's supply still hasn't fully been released.

This is actually connected to what we talked about before: the low-rate old-mortgage lock-in effect. Many homeowners hold very cheap long-term loans and aren't necessarily willing to take on high rates again just to move.

So even under high-rate pressure, New York's supply won't necessarily surge all at once.

But look at some other U.S. markets, and the story is different. Take Austin. In August 2026, the median list price in the Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos metro fell 9.8% year over year. List price per square foot fell 8.1% year over year. Inventory was basically flat year over year. That's already a very obvious difference from New York. (Realtor)

Why? This gets to the most important thing in real estate: supply.

If a place built a large number of new homes over the past few years, when rates rise and demand suddenly weakens, choices on the market can increase quickly. Buyers will say: "If you don't cut the price, I can go look at the next building over." Sellers' bargaining power naturally changes.

But in markets like New York where land and housing supply are more constrained, things can be different. Especially in areas where demand has long existed and supply is limited, high rates can push down transaction volume but won't necessarily knock prices down right away.

That's why we can't simply say: "The Fed raises rates, so U.S. home prices fall together." It's not that simple.

Look at Florida again. In August 2026, Florida had about 286,000 active listings statewide; Realtor.com data shows inventory grew 43.96% over the past three years. The statewide median list price was about $419,000, down about 3.5% year over year. (Realtor)

In the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach metro, inventory fell 15% year over year, but the median list price still fell 2% year over year. This tells us again: between inventory and prices, it's not a simple one-plus-one relationship. (Realtor)

Because real estate has many other variables. For example: is population flowing in or out? How are local jobs? Is there a lot of new-home construction? What's land supply like? Property taxes? Insurance costs? Rents? What's the investor share?

All of these change how sensitive a real estate market is to rates.

So I increasingly feel that truly smart real estate analysis doesn't ask "How are U.S. home prices?" but asks "Which market?" And even further: "Which city? Which neighborhood? Which type of home?"

Because within the same city, different home types can be two different markets. New homes and old homes, single-family and apartments, investment properties and owner-occupied homes, luxury markets and starter markets — they can all react differently to high rates.

That's also why, as a New York real estate agent, I especially enjoy observing: how macro rates finally land in one specific neighborhood.

For example, with mortgages near 7% all the same, a Queens family may care most about: monthly payment, property taxes, schools, commute, maintenance costs. While a Florida buyer may have to pay more attention to: insurance, hurricane risk, HOA fees, and local new-home supply.

The same Fed rate table, landing on different families, is already a completely different ledger.

So that's also why we've been saying: high rates don't directly decide home prices. They're more like a stress test. They slowly magnify a market's own problems.

Places where supply was already tight may show: transaction volume falls, but prices stay relatively resilient. Places with ample supply may show: inventory rises, sellers start cutting prices, buyers gain bargaining power. And if a place has slowing population growth, lots of new-home supply, and jobs and incomes under pressure at the same time, then high rates' impact may be even more visible.

So when we look at real estate going forward, I think we can remember a very simple formula: rates × supply × demand × local economy. These four together are a real estate market's true temperature. Not looking alone at "the Fed hiked 25 basis points today."

Because the Fed can decide the national price of money, but it can't decide: how many homes list in New York today. Nor can it decide: how many new homes Austin builds this year. Even less can it decide: what Florida's insurance costs are.

These things are what finally decide: why the same rates produce completely different real estate cycles in different places.

So back to today's question: why do New York, Texas, and Florida tell different stories facing the same high rates? Because: rates are just one variable. Real estate's true answers are always hidden in: supply, demand, population, jobs, financing, taxes, and local people's real housing needs.

So next time you see news saying "U.S. home prices rose" or "U.S. home prices fell," I'd suggest not rushing to conclusions. First ask: where? Because U.S. real estate was never one market. It's thousands of different small markets pieced together.

I'm Tony. Next time, we keep going down this path. We already know: high rates affect buyers, affect sellers, affect transaction volume, and affect different cities. So the next question is: what about real estate developers? They may be the ones who need to recalculate their ledgers earliest in a high-rate environment.